#Trust Wallet安全事件 After reviewing the entire chain of the Trust Wallet incident, I have to say—this is exactly why I now treat the word "randomness" as a formidable enemy.

150 billion dollars worth of Bitcoin cracked by the US authorities may seem like a victory for law enforcement, but the truth behind it is even more terrifying. Concepts like Mersenne Twister weak random number generators and Milk Sad incidents are not some advanced black technologies; they are simply failures in the most basic security links of wallets and mining pools. Between 2019 and 2020, those 220,000 weak-key wallets' users had no idea that the private keys generated by their tools were like a "faulty device," constantly looping within a limited range.

The most ironic part is the large-scale withdrawal in December 2020—136,951 Bitcoins were transferred out overnight. At that time, no one dared to confirm whether it was hackers or the project team selling at the high point. It wasn't until the bx seed vulnerability was exposed in 2023 that someone revisited the case and found that the wallet transfers in 2020 perfectly matched Lubian's weak key range. Five years—only then did we understand what had happened.

The lesson is very clear to me: your wallet isn't your money, but first and foremost, your wallet must be secure. Those wallets claiming to support multiple chains and full features look convenient, but once the underlying random number algorithm is flawed, all your "security awareness" is useless. Now I ask every wallet—how is this private key generated? What algorithm is used? Has it undergone an independent security audit? If I don't get clear answers to these questions, I won't even risk putting a dollar in.

This isn't over-caution; it's a lesson learned through time.