After 29 days of conflict, what other options does the United States have regarding Iran?

Title: Day 29: What could possibly be the U.S. options in Iran?
Author: John Spencer
Translator: Peggy, BlockBeats

Original Author: Rhythm BlockBeats

Source:

Reprinted from: Mars Finance

Editor’s Note: While the outside world is still debating “whether it will evolve into ground warfare,” the logic of this conflict has already moved beyond the framework of traditional warfare.

This article attempts to answer not whether the U.S. will “go in,” but rather what means the U.S. might have to change the opponent’s behavior without occupying the capital. From missiles and naval forces to energy exports, power systems, and information control to internal governance structures, the targets of attacks are expanding from a singular military capability to the overall operating system of a nation.

In this process, the real key is no longer regime change but rather forcing adjustments in decision-making under multiple pressures by simultaneously suppressing “combat capability” and “governance capacity.” This nonlinear, cross-dimensional method of exerting pressure is becoming a new logic of warfare.

Therefore, what is more noteworthy about this conflict is not the parts that have already occurred, but the options that have yet to be unfolded.

Below is the original text:

The U.S.-Iran war has lasted for 29 days. Now, true strategic and military analysis is increasingly difficult to distinguish from politicized views, conjecture, and narratives. Too many people habitually jump directly to the conclusion of “full ground invasion,” as if the only choice for the U.S. is to capture Tehran, forcibly control the nuclear facilities, defeat a so-called million-man army, and then fall back into the quagmire of decades-long nation-building or a Maoist-style guerrilla war.

This is not analysis. This is merely a superficial judgment based on outdated or even biased models of war.

President Trump has stated that he will suspend attacks on Iran’s energy infrastructure for 10 days, and this deadline has now been extended to April 6. We are currently in this time window. But the real question is not what has already happened, but rather what options remain next.

From military strikes to system paralysis

It is certain that the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Israel will continue systematic strikes against Iran’s military system. At the beginning of the war, Iran possessed thousands of ballistic missiles, hundreds of launchers, a distributed drone network, multi-layered naval capabilities in the Persian Gulf, and a military-industrial system with redundancy and survivability. This system is being weakened but has not been completely destroyed.

At the same time, Israel’s targets are not limited to military capabilities themselves; more critically, they aim to weaken the regime’s ability to maintain control in the post-war period. This includes eliminating political and military leadership, striking internal stability forces such as the Basij, and destroying checkpoints, intelligence nodes, and internal security networks.

This is not just tactical action but a strategic pressure aimed at both “means” and “will”: weakening both combat capabilities and governance capacities. This is indeed a way to force the opponent to change behavior without occupying the capital.

Any discussion must anchor on established strategic objectives. According to U.S. senior officials, the goals of “Operation Epic Fury” include: destroying Iran’s missile system and its production capabilities, dismantling its naval forces and their ability to threaten global shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and preventing it from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Although “regime change” has been discussed, it is not an official objective. The real goal is “behavior change.” The current regime has been offered diplomatic paths to adjust its policies, which is crucial because it determines the boundaries of strategic options. The core of this war is not the occupation of Tehran, but rather the paralysis of the regime, the destruction of its capabilities, and forcing it to accept new conditions.

Even if the regime collapses under military and economic pressure, the U.S. can still achieve its objectives in a new strategic environment. However, it is important to emphasize that achieving objectives does not rely on the collapse of the regime.

From this moment on, options are not diminishing; they are expanding.

One option is to strike at the economic “centers” of the regime. Kharg Island accounts for about 85% to 90% of Iran’s oil exports, typically around 1.5 to 2 million barrels per day. This oil is the regime’s primary source of hard currency. Controlling it, paralyzing it, or directly destroying its export capabilities will not only impact the economy itself but also the entire regime’s ability to fund the military, maintain its power network, and sustain internal control.

This is significant because the regime has already shown signs of vulnerability under economic pressure. The protests in January 2026 were sparked by inflation, instability in the banking system, and the inability to provide basic public services (including severe water shortages affecting millions in Tehran). There were even discussions about relocating the capital due to the inability to provide safe drinking water. The regime’s response was large-scale violent repression, resulting in over 32,000 civilian deaths in one of the most brutal suppression actions in its modern history. Therefore, economic pressure is not a theoretical exercise but has already pushed the regime to the brink.

Another option is to strike at the national power grid. Iran’s power system is concentrated in major urban hubs, and precision strikes on key substations and transmission nodes can trigger cascading blackouts across the region—Tehran will plunge into darkness.

Once power is lost, the regime will immediately be in trouble. Command and control, monitoring systems, communication networks, and internal security coordination all rely on electricity. By implementing precision strikes on key nodes, widespread systemic paralysis can be induced without completely destroying infrastructure. The U.S. has demonstrated this capability multiple times in past conflicts.

Cyber warfare further amplifies this effect. Iran has repeatedly used internet blackouts to control society, and this capability can also be exploited in reverse—disrupting the regime’s command network while restoring connectivity for the people through external systems. Information itself will become a weapon, with narrative authority, coordination ability, and cognitive advantages shifting from the regime’s hands.

The Strait of Hormuz remains a decisive strategic location. Approximately 20% of the world’s oil supply (about 20 million barrels per day) passes through this channel. Iran’s long-standing strategy has been to threaten and manipulate this flow.

One option is to shift from “deterrence” to “control.” Occupying or neutralizing key islands. For a long time, experts have viewed Abu Musa Island and Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands as key terrain for controlling the strait. Qeshm Island to the north has deployed Revolutionary Guard naval facilities, missile systems, and surveillance infrastructure. These locations provide Iran with anti-ship missile coverage, fast attack craft operations, and maritime coercion capabilities. Once these islands are controlled or neutralized, Iran’s bargaining power in the strait will fundamentally change.

Iran has also built a system in the strait similar to “toll booths.” The Revolutionary Guard has effectively established a system requiring vessels to obtain approval, navigate under its influence, and in some cases pay millions of dollars in “security passage fees.” Reports indicate that the fees for each oil tanker can reach up to $2 million, with selective releases based on political stance, while controlled shipping lanes are set near Larak Island.

The U.S. and Israel possess the capability to systematically dismantle this network: striking its command structure, destroying coastal radar, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance nodes, and command centers, as well as eliminating fast boats, drones, and missile positions that enforce control. Once this system is dismantled, Iran will lose the ability to convert global critical channels into sources of revenue and tools of coercion.

Another related option is to intercept Iranian oil exports at sea. Iran exports about 1.5 to 2 million barrels daily, much of which is accomplished through networks that evade sanctions. By intercepting, diverting tankers, and conducting extensive inspections and seizures, this system can be compressed to the brink of a halt. Such actions have already been initiated within a limited scope, and if further expanded, will drive regime income to near zero. Without income, there will be no missiles, no proxy networks, no repression capabilities, and even the inability to sustain national operations.

Some options, however, turn inward. Iran’s population exceeds 85 million, is highly urbanized, and has long harbored dissatisfaction. Existing polls, protest patterns, and observable social unrest all indicate that over 50% of the population opposes the current regime, and it may even be higher. This is not a solid power base. The protests in January 2026 were a clear signal of this underlying pressure.

So far, the public has mostly been instructed to “shelter in place.” But this strategy may change. Through information dissemination, safe passages, and psychological warfare, the mechanisms of control between the populace and the regime can gradually be separated.

At the same time, support can be provided to internal resistance forces, including airdrops of weapons, communications, and intelligence. Multiple fractures exist within Iran—long-standing contradictions at ethnic, political, and regional levels have sparked opposition and unrest multiple times. When external pressure and internal resistance overlap, the regime is more likely to experience fragmentation or at least endure greater pressure.

Meanwhile, the scope of strikes can also continue to expand beyond traditional military targets. The regime’s control system is essentially a network: including leadership, Revolutionary Guard headquarters, Basij forces, police, intelligence agencies, and repression infrastructure. Targeting these nodes will accelerate the disintegration of central authority.

History shows that pressure can create fissures: the military begins to hesitate, intelligence systems become fragmented, political elites realign, and personnel defect. Collaborating with these defectors can often yield far greater effects than mere strikes.

Of course, we still have many unknowns. We cannot fully grasp where the regime’s strengths and weaknesses lie. But some signs are worth noting. For example, reports indicate that Iran is attempting to expand mobilization efforts, even lowering the age for recruitment to 12, which suggests it is under immense pressure. This is not behavior typical of a confident regime.

These options do not exist in isolation but can be combined: destroying missile systems and production capabilities, dismantling naval forces, continuously weakening nuclear programs, and blocking its external projection capabilities. Simultaneously, by striking leadership and command systems, its decision-making can be paralyzed, applying pressure across military, economic, informational, and political dimensions.

The core lies in simultaneously striking at the regime’s “means” and “will,” rather than proceeding in sequence. Creating multiple dilemmas that exceed its coping capacity forces it into a passive survival mode, elongating decision cycles and undermining its coordination and control capabilities.

The essence of war is “choice in uncertainty.”

War is not a checklist but a dynamic matching of objectives, paths, and means under uncertain conditions. Various options can be advanced sequentially, implemented in combination, or launched simultaneously.

At the same time, caution is warranted against those who make analogies with “certainty.” Iran is not Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq, nor is it 1968, 2002, or 2003. Each context is entirely different. Political objectives vary from “changing regime behavior” to “maintaining regime survival.” Past wars often involved nation-building, democratic exports, long-term counterinsurgency, and enemies having external sanctuary space, none of which apply currently. Geographical conditions, technological circumstances, intelligence capabilities, and regional dynamics have all changed. The available options are more diverse and more targeted.

We know what has happened, but we do not know what will happen next. More importantly, we cannot predict the next steps of all parties involved.

This uncertainty is not a flaw in analysis but the essence of war.