Iran's "de facto top leader" has been killed

“He ultimately fulfilled his long-standing wish and honorably achieved martyrdom in service.” On March 18th, early morning local time, the Secretariat of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council issued a statement confirming that Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, was killed earlier in the airstrike.

Earlier, the Israel Defense Forces announced that on the night of March 16th to the morning of March 17th, Larijani was targeted and killed in a pinpoint attack by the Israeli Air Force in a hideout apartment in Tehran, Iran. According to subsequent reports from Iran, Larijani was killed along with his son Murtaza, Deputy Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Reza Biayat, and a group of guards.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi issued an official statement in the early hours of March 18th, mourning Larijani deeply and vowing revenge. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) then announced the launch of Operation “True Commitment-4,” the 61st wave of attacks, in retaliation for Larijani’s assassination.

Since February 28, 2026, when then-Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and senior officials of the Supreme Leader’s Office were killed in a joint US-Israeli military operation, 68-year-old Larijani has been regarded by the US and Israel as the de facto highest authority in Iran. He also played the role of Iran’s hardline spokesperson abroad, active on social media, dismissively calling the US government “Epstein’s remnants.”

This hardline leader initially survived the attack, with various speculations about why. Some believe he merely escaped the airstrike by luck; others suggest the US intentionally left him alive, hoping that this former Iran nuclear deal negotiator could “cooperate” with Trump’s plans. This is based on the experience Trump gained from the January raid on Venezuela and the kidnapping of President Maduro. But Larijani chose to fight to the very end.

Under Larijani’s leadership, and possibly under collective leadership involving him, Iran’s regime did not collapse quickly after over a month of unequal warfare. Instead, it found new ways to resist in the Strait of Hormuz. Despite Trump’s persistent demands for major shipping companies to “show some courage” and let ships pass, after at least 16 commercial vessels were attacked, no one was willing to take risks anymore. With the strait “effectively closed,” global oil prices surged about 40% by March 16th.

Today, although the US and Israel still hold military superiority, the US military cannot control the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, US casualties in the conflict have exceeded 200. This makes plans previously discussed by Trump team—such as assassinating Iran’s new Supreme Leader or deploying special forces to transfer highly enriched uranium—less likely to lead to a “victory” declaration.

The assassination of Larijani demonstrates that, faced with increasing political risks, Trump has not reverted to transactional tactics but is willing to undertake greater military risks. On the same day, Iran also confirmed the deaths of Basij militia commander Gholam Reza Suleimani and his deputy. According to Israeli military sources, the Basij leadership was targeted in a pinpoint strike at a newly established tent base.

The Final Battle

On March 16th, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced that Iran’s counterattack had entered its 55th round. In this round, Iran used super-heavy, hypersonic missiles and suicide drones to precisely strike US, Israeli military bases, and Iran’s weapons production and logistics facilities.

This was the last counterattack led by Larijani during his lifetime. Like most attacks since March 2nd, the results were modest but symbolically significant. Seventy-two hours after the start of the war, the US and Israel announced they had destroyed over 80% of Iran’s missile launch platforms remaining after the “12-Day War” in 2025. Since then, Iran has only launched single-digit missile strikes at US military bases and Israel each day. But as this round reached its 55th iteration, new speculation arose: does Iran still possess enough missiles and drones for a prolonged attrition war with the US and Israel?

A report from the US think tank “War Research Institute” on March 15th dismissed this speculation, arguing that Iran’s current counterattack pattern is supported under a lack of unified leadership and does not indicate a strategic plan to preserve strength. An unnamed Iranian scholar told China News Weekly that, after the deaths of many top military and political leaders, Iran’s current power structure remains unstable. The scholar believes that the so-called “Revolutionary Guard controlling power,” as suggested by Western think tanks like the “War Research Institute,” is not necessarily accurate and does not mean Iran has entered a stable state.

However, the debate within US policy circles over whether Iran is maintaining its missile stockpiles reflects a broader concern that Iran still possesses strategic deterrence, a worry that has grown as the war continues.

In stark contrast to symbolic counterattacks against the US and Israel, on March 16th, targets in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE were hit by drone attacks, including Dubai International Airport and the UAE’s only oil export terminal, Fujeirah Port outside the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia intercepted over 60 drones. Additionally, the Majnoon oil field in Iraq and the Shakh natural gas field in the UAE were attacked. Middle Eastern media widely reported that this was Iran’s first successful attack on oil and gas infrastructure since the current round of conflict began, causing panic among Gulf states.

Iran did not fully admit these attacks. State media Tasnim News Agency quoted military officials saying some hostile forces were “mimicking Iran’s drones” in attacking neighboring countries. It is certain, however, that the March 16th attacks marked a significant escalation since February 28th. Earlier, Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mujtaba Khamenei, in his first public statement, said Iran would open new “battlefronts where enemies lack experience.”

Western think tanks like the “War Research Institute” analyze that Larijani formulated five major action plans for Iran: drone and missile attacks aimed at causing US and Israeli casualties and economic damage; drone, missile strikes, and mine-laying to disrupt Persian Gulf shipping; proxy attacks by resistance axes like Hezbollah; cyberattacks on key Middle Eastern infrastructure; and other asymmetric tactics.

Many believe the most effective of these is the second plan—disrupting shipping in the Strait of Hormuz—since even a single successful attack could have strategic effects. Whether it is cutting off transportation through the strait or attacking energy facilities and ports in Gulf states, the goal is not necessarily to completely halt shipping or oil production but to threaten industry and third-party stakeholders, causing insurance premiums to soar and triggering chain reactions in capital markets, thereby allowing Iran to achieve a strategic victory.

In 2022, Yemen’s Houthi forces launched a few drones against Saudi oil facilities, securing a favorable ceasefire agreement. Bloomberg estimates that if Iran continues to control Middle Eastern energy transportation, Qatar and Kuwait’s GDP could decline by up to 14%, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE could see declines over 5%, marking the worst recession since the 1990s.

This series of plans against the US has been Larijani’s long-term effort. In August 2025, two months after the bleak “12-Day War” ended, Larijani, who had already stepped back from frontline politics, was reinstated by then-Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. His tasks included participating in US negotiations, seeking external support, and rebuilding Iran’s military and security networks for larger future conflicts.

Who Will Succeed Larijani?

Since the war began on February 28th, although Larijani’s leadership of counterattacks has had some effect, ongoing US-Israeli airstrikes have caused daily losses to Iran’s missile and drone production bases, storage facilities, and launch sites. Additionally, continuous Israeli strikes on Iran’s regime infrastructure have nearly destroyed Basij militia bases and police headquarters in Tehran and key provinces. While not enough to topple the regime, some small armed groups are already stirring.

According to official reports, recent armed attacks in southeastern Sistan-Baluchistan Province have resulted in police casualties. In the oil-rich southwestern province of Khuzestan, security forces eliminated a group of “armed insurgents” before they could carry out attacks. Officials warn that the upcoming Nowruz fire festival, known for its risks, could provide opportunities for insurgents.

Now, with Larijani dead, the question of “who is leading Iran” has become a hot topic. Traditionally, coordination among government, military, Revolutionary Guard, and various factions was managed by the Office of the Supreme Leader, but most senior officials there died with Khamenei on February 28th. The successor, Mujtaba Khamenei, remains largely out of sight, with uncertain health. An unnamed Iranian scholar told China News Weekly that, unlike his father, Mujtaba’s role may be more of a mediator than a decision-maker, mainly executing consensus decisions rather than setting independent policies.

Among survivors of the February 28th attack, Larijani was the most capable of coordination and held significant authority to command the Revolutionary Guard. Born into a Shia cleric family, with a father influential in religious circles and brothers holding senior government positions, Larijani served as parliament speaker for 12 years and repeatedly as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and security advisor to the Supreme Leader, responsible for liaising between government, military, and the Guard.

Throughout his long career, Larijani was known for his steadiness and pragmatism, earning trust from Khamenei and navigating between reformist presidents and the IRGC, even gaining some international reputation for pushing the Iran nuclear deal. Some believe his leadership potential was the reason he was twice disqualified from running for president in 2021 and 2024. But after the 2025 war, when Iran needed someone to rebuild its security system, Larijani was the only suitable candidate.

Before the war on February 28th, Iran’s reformist think tank, the Tehran Strategic Studies Institute, senior researcher Jafar Haghpanah, told China News Weekly that due to internal crises and the war situation, the Supreme National Security Council led by Larijani had become dominant in Iranian politics. He was responsible for conveying Iran’s final responses in indirect US-Iran negotiations, more so than Foreign Minister Araghchi.

Subsequently, with Khamenei and his officials dead, Larijani ascended to the peak of power.

But now, he has been assassinated. President Raisi, with limited political experience and labeled as a “reformist,” struggles to command broad support during wartime. Under this context, Western and European think tanks express concern about the war’s future. Elina Granameyer of the European Council on Foreign Relations said Larijani was the best candidate to facilitate future ceasefire negotiations. Raz Zimmt of the US Institute for National Security Studies said Iran no longer has a pragmatic hardliner like Larijani, and the next de facto leader, such as newly appointed IRGC Commander Ahmad Wahidi on March 1st, will likely be more radical.

However, targeting Larijani signals a shift in US and Israeli war objectives. Some conservative Western think tanks now argue that if Trump wants to regain control over how and when the war ends, he must directly control the Strait of Hormuz. This could involve deploying Marines to seize strategic islands like Abu Musa and Tunb, and even attacking Iran’s key oil export hub, Kharg Island. Compared to such large-scale ground operations, killing Larijani seems minor.

On March 14th, the US Navy’s amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli, carrying 2,500 Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, departed from the Indo-Pacific region toward the Middle East, expected to complete deployment by late March. By then, Trump will have to decide. Some analysts worry this could plunge the US into a prolonged ground war, making it harder for Trump to unilaterally declare victory.

For Iran’s current leadership, balancing limited resources to maintain domestic stability, control the Strait of Hormuz, deter Gulf energy production and transportation, retaliate against US bases and Israel, and prepare for possible US special operations or ground invasions involves extremely complex decisions.

Source: China News Weekly

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