Early Investment Events Next Week (April 6 – April 12)

（Source: Gangtise Research）

🔥U.S.-Iran negotiations: the countdown starts, and the geopolitical risk premium won’t disappear

The U.S. has set a final deadline for Iran of April 6.

This is not an ordinary negotiation. The U.S. has clearly signaled that it hopes to reach an agreement on the nuclear issue before then. Given that the two sides have already gone through multiple rounds of indirect talks since March, Trump’s decision to “officially announce” at this time point is itself a pressure tactic.

However, the disagreements on both sides of the negotiating table are more fundamental than market-priced volatility.

Iran refuses direct dialogue and insists on conveying messages through intermediaries. The U.S. demands free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, while Iran treats sovereignty over the strait as a core issue. On the scope of sanctions relief, Iran will only accept limited easing, whereas the U.S.’s bargaining chip is “a comprehensive strategic compromise.” These three structural obstacles mean it will be difficult for the two sides to reach an agreement with real substance in the foreseeable future.

Even more worth watching is that the negotiations themselves are being instrumentalized by both sides.

On one hand, the U.S. is strengthening regional security deployments in the Persian Gulf while negotiating. On the other hand, Iran is simultaneously advancing legislative procedures and emergency deployments. Negotiations and security alert measures are advancing in parallel, with both sides maintaining a standoff and competitive posture. This “two-track parallel” setup means that even if the April 6 talks do not break down, the geopolitical risk premium will not fade.

The implications for asset allocation are clear:

Crude oil and gold have a relatively strong phased outlook. If the stalemate over passage through the Strait of Hormuz continues beyond the deadline, even without a large-scale conflict, the continued tightening on the supply side itself provides only limited downside room for oil prices. Gold benefits from a systematic rise in safe-haven demand.

The pressure on risk assets is also clear. U.S. stocks’ technology sector valuations are relatively high; amid an environment where growth is slowing and inflation stickiness persists, it faces adjustment pressure. Equity assets in emerging markets also face the risk of foreign capital outflows.

What needs close attention is:

Whether the outcome of the talks will trigger short-term, sharp volatility in the crude oil market. Whether an agreement is reached or the situation drags into a stalemate, it will break the current fragile balance.

🔥Central bank signals: the Fed minutes reprice later, and India rate cuts are already a done deal

On April 9, the Federal Reserve will release the detailed minutes of the March 18–19 policy meeting.

There is not much suspense in this meeting itself—rates will remain unchanged at 4.25%–4.50%, and the dot plot shows expectations of 75 bps of rate cuts in 2026. Powell also reiterated that “tariff inflation may be temporary.” What is truly worth digging into is the depth of discussions among officials in the minutes, and the boundaries of their wording.

Three core questions will drive the market’s interpretation:

The depth of discussion on stagflation risk. If the term “stagflation” appears more frequently in the minutes, it indicates that the Fed’s internal concerns about both slowing growth and sticky inflation are converging. This would shrink the room for a May rate cut. The current market-implied probability of a May rate cut is about 60%; if the minutes release hawkish signals, it could fall back to around 40%.

Assessment of Trump’s tariff policy. This is the only section in the minutes that could potentially include “forward-looking guidance.” Officials’ judgment on the impact of tariffs will directly affect how the market prices the Fed’s policy path.

Attention to financial stability. If the minutes mention asset price bubbles or risks in financial markets, it may reinforce a more “wait-and-see” stance.

However, there is one key fact that needs to be kept clear: after the March meeting, the March employment report (nonfarm payrolls) has already been released—220k new jobs, far above expectations. This set of data has partially changed some officials’ consideration framework. The minutes are naturally “lagging”; they reflect officials’ views from March 18–19, not the current market environment.

The real test will be the March CPI data to be released on April 10. With nonfarm already having been “somewhat hot,” the CPI performance will become the core variable for the Fed’s May decision.

In Asia-Pacific, the signals are even clearer:

On April 8, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Reserve Bank of India will release their interest rate decisions. On April 10, the Bank of Korea will follow suit.

The market consensus expectation is: India will cut rates by 25 bps to 6.25%; New Zealand will hold or cut by 25 bps; and Korea will keep rates unchanged at 3.0%.

The certainty of India’s rate cut is relatively high. Economic growth remains at above 7%, inflation continues to cool, and policy space has opened. The rate cut provides liquidity support for India’s stock market (Nifty 50), but pressure for the rupee to depreciate will also increase. Real estate and consumer sectors benefit from a looser environment, but IT export stocks (which naturally benefit from rupee depreciation) may face pressure.

If New Zealand chooses to cut rates, it will confirm the narrative of a “loose-for-loose competition” among developed economies. The AUD/NZD cross-exchange rate faces downward pressure, and the space for carry trades will be compressed.

Korea’s baseline scenario is to keep rates unchanged, but behind it lies systemic concern about household debt (105% of GDP) and slowing exports. The stock performance of export-oriented companies such as Samsung and SK hynix is highly tied to expectations of KRW depreciation.

The convergence point of the three clues is: global central banks are moving into a “data-dependent” mode. India’s rate cut is almost a certain event; the Fed’s path depends on data; and Korea is effectively forced to stay on hold. What truly needs caution is that if the decisions of the three major central banks form a narrative of “collective easing,” it could increase attention to gold and emerging-market bonds.

🔥A-share market regulation: new rules take effect, and market microstructure is being reshaped

On April 7 and April 10, two new sets of rules will come into effect in succession. Although these two rules seem independent, they in fact point in the same direction: the microstructure of China’s A-share market is being systematically reshaped.

First rule: the CSRC’s “Several Provisions on Short-Term Trading Regulation”

The new rule takes effect on April 7. The core change is expanding the scope of what counts as short-term trading—equity incentives, agreement transfers, and other trading behaviors that were previously in a gray area are now clearly included in the regulatory framework. At the same time, exemption conditions are refined, and regulatory standards are becoming stricter to “forfeit gains + fines.”

This is not a mild adjustment to the rules. For quantitative strategies, compliance costs within the 6-month window will increase. High-frequency trading, ETF arbitrage, large-lot de-stocking, and other strategies all need to be reexamined. Some private funds may face pressure to reduce their scale or adjust their trading frequency.

For controlling shareholders, flexibility in reducing holdings declines, and space for nonstandard share reduction behavior is compressed. In the short term, selling pressure in the secondary market may ease in stages. But one long-term effect that needs attention is that controlling shareholders’ financing needs may shift from “direct share reduction” to alternative paths such as “equity pledges” or “convertible bonds,” and so on.

The ETF market is also affected. Market makers’ and arbitrageurs’ activities are constrained, and the discount/premium rates of sector/theme ETFs with weaker liquidity may widen.

Second rule: the three ministries’ “Internet Platform Price Conduct Rules”

The new rule effective on April 10 bans “big data killing customers,” false promotions, and algorithm collusion pricing. It requires promotion rules to be transparent and prohibits “raise first and then reduce.”

This rule directly targets one of the core profit models of the platform economy: personalized pricing (price discrimination). In algorithm-driven recommendation systems, the essence of “different faces for different people” is to push different prices to different users in order to maximize profits. After it is prohibited, platforms may shift to an alternative model of “uniform pricing + tiered membership.”

The short-term impact is slower growth in advertising and commission income—platforms such as Alibaba, JD.com, and Meituan need to adjust their recommendation algorithms, and technical investment will increase. Price transparency for consumers will improve, but personalized discounts for “different faces for different people” will decline, and the actual payment price may rise.

Changes in the competitive landscape are also worth watching: compliance costs have limited marginal impact on large platforms, but the space for differentiated pricing among vertical platforms is compressed, and industry competition may trend toward homogenization.

The common direction of these two rules is: regulators are systematically compressing the gray areas of market rules. Whether it is rule arbitrage related to controlling shareholders’ share reductions or the issue of algorithmic opacity in platform pricing, both are being gradually brought into a more transparent framework.

🔥Industry watch: aesthetic fatigue from overlapping trade shows, and NIO’s technology bet

On April 9, Shenzhen and Shanghai will each host four heavyweight exhibitions: the Shenzhen AI Computing Power Industry Conference, the Shenzhen International Semiconductor Exhibition, the Shanghai Medical Devices Expo (CMEF), and the Shenzhen Electronic Information Expo.

This is a “stacked day” of relatively large-scale “technology exhibitions” in the spring of 2026, and also a key milestone for testing the substance of the narrative of “new quality productive forces.”

The core topics of the AI computing power conference have already shifted.

The main theme now is: demand growth for training computing power for large models is slowing (training is approaching saturation), while demand for inference computing power is surging (as applications move into implementation). The three directions that need to be重点 verified are the cluster deployment case studies of domestically produced AI chips (Huawei Ascend, Cambricon), the penetration rate of liquid cooling and heat dissipation technology, and the feasibility of computing power leasing business models.

A harsh reality is this: since 2024, the aesthetic fatigue among institutional investors from “more releases at exhibitions and fewer implementations” has been spreading. The focus is shifting from “technical parameters” to “business closed-loop execution.” Stable operation of large 10,000-card clusters, the emergence of scaled revenue, and clearly defined customer profiles—these are the substantive factors that can truly drive a higher valuation for the sector.

The keyword for the semiconductor exhibition is “useful and affordable.”

Domestic substitution has already passed the stage of “it can be used.” Cost-performance and delivery capability have become new dimensions of competition. Order situations for advanced packaging (Chiplet) equipment, and the certification progress of automotive-grade MCUs are windows for observing the deepening development of domestic substitution.

The medical device expo and the electronic information expo each face their own dilemmas.

For medical devices, amid the expansion of centralized procurement, innovative products such as surgical robots, high-end imaging equipment, and AI-assisted diagnosis are the direction for companies to break out. The progress of domestic substitution and the overseas expansion strategy (Southeast Asia and Middle East markets) are key things to watch.

The awkwardness for the electronic information expo is that the upgrade cycle for AI phones and PCs has not yet formed a clear upside turning point. If top brands such as Huawei, Xiaomi, and OPPO do not deliver breakthrough new products, the consumer electronics sector may continue to languish.

On the same day, NIO will release the ES9.

The ES9’s three core selling points are: semi-solid-state batteries (energy density >300Wh/kg), the next-generation city NOA intelligent driving system, and the 3.0 battery swapping network.

The semi-solid-state battery mass production timeline is a key variable. If it is confirmed that mass production and vehicle loading will occur in Q4 2026, NIO is expected to be relatively ahead on the mass production schedule and could have some technical first-mover advantage. Supply chain companies such as those producing solid-state electrolytes and silicon-carbon anodes may gain valuation premiums. But if the press conference is merely presenting a “technology roadmap,” the market reaction may be quite muted.

The competitive landscape for intelligent driving is also clear: NIO’s current city NOA coverage is about 200 cities, while Huawei’s is about 300 cities. The maturity of its no-map solution coverage determines the competitive gap versus the Huawei ecosystem (AITO and Zhijie).

The battery swapping model is the core point of controversy for NIO. The scale of more than 3,000 battery swapping stations looks large, but utilization at a single station is only about 20–30%, and the profitability timetable remains unclear. If the ES9 can support “flexible battery upgrades,” it could enhance the attractiveness of the battery swapping model, but the utilization issue would not be solved as a result.

NIO’s strategic dilemma is: 220k units sold in 2025, and a target of 300k units in 2026. The ES9 is a key model for pushing into the high-end market above 400k yuan. However, the brand premium capability is weaker than the Huawei ecosystem, and cost control capability is weaker than BYD. Whether the narrative of “technology leadership” can be transformed into the reality of “market share” is the core proposition that determines the stock price trend.

🔥Energy markets: the truth behind falling oil prices, and Russia oil export permits as puffery

Falling oil prices themselves are not a positive; they are a signal of weak demand.

For the aviation and logistics sectors, lower fuel costs do improve gross margins by 0.5–1 percentage points. But this improvement is “passive”—oil prices falling reflect insufficient physical demand, not proactive optimization on the cost side. Even though the energy subcomponent of the CPI falling reinforces the “low inflation” narrative and opens space for monetary policy, the risk of “self-fulfilling deflation expectations” also needs to be kept in mind.

Refinery-side pressure is even more direct: cracking margins narrow, independent refinery operating rates may be lowered, and the growth rate of crude oil import demand may slow.

The variable that truly needs attention is the U.S.-Iran negotiation on April 6. The impact on oil prices from the outcome of the talks is “active,” which is completely different from the “passive follow-through” of domestic pricing adjustment mechanisms. If talks break down, supply risks in the Strait of Hormuz will drive an oil price rebound; if an agreement is unexpectedly reached, oil prices may fall further.

The Russia oil sales license set to expire on April 11 is a game of puffery.

Some of the Russia oil sales licenses approved by the U.S. allow certain Russia oil trades to pass through the G7 price cap mechanism. After this license expires, the market worries that Russia oil exports will be blocked, which would then affect global supply.

The total volume of Russia oil supply will not decrease just because the license expires—it will only adjust trade routes. If the license is not renewed, Russia oil exports will shift more toward non-Western markets such as India and China. Enforcement of the G7 price cap (USD 60 per barrel) may weaken, and Russia oil’s actual export price could rise back to above USD 70. But this would be more a signal that “sanctions effects are weakening,” rather than a supply shock.

A scenario closer to reality is that there is tension between the Biden administration’s leftover permitting policy and Trump’s statements of “toughness toward Russia,” and the final outcome is likely to be “silent approval of an extension” or “case-by-case approvals.” This is a “technical issue,” not a “policy shift,” and the market impact is likely to be quite limited.

🔥Next week’s investment event calendar

Data source: Gangtise Research

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