"The Battle of Hormuz," it's time to face the music.

Ask AI · On the surface, U.S.-Iran talks are making progress—yet everyone is really trying to buy time?

Local time on March 26, Trump posted on social media saying that at the request of the Iranian government, the U.S. will pause strikes on Iran’s energy facilities for 10 days, resuming at 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time on April 6.

That day, Trump also unveiled, during a meeting, the “big gift” Iran gave the United States: allowing 10 oil tankers to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. He also said this was a “big gift” Iran sent to show its sincerity in the negotiations, that the talks “found the right people,” and that current related negotiations were “going smoothly.”

Lebanese media, citing an Iranian source, said of Trump’s remarks about the “big gift” that Trump was putting on a political performance and lacked factual basis. Iranian media also reported that the Strait of Hormuz is still closed to the United States and Israel.

While the White House announced the talks’ progress in a high-profile manner, the Pentagon increased troop deployments to the Middle East, and the island-landing combat plan was not removed from the table. In its response via intermediaries, Iran did not accept the conditions Trump laid out; instead, it reset the negotiating premises in a more hardline way.

Under this haze of gunfire, are the negotiations genuine diplomatic efforts—or merely a delaying tactic by everyone to buy time?

Local time March 26, 2026, Trump holds a cabinet meeting at the White House. Photo/Visual China

The more they fight, the more contradictory it gets

Peace talks in one hand, troop build-up in the other—diplomatic gestures and military deployments are moving forward in parallel on the same timeline. This is an extension of Trump’s usual logic of maximum pressure in a wartime context: use military presence to add bargaining chips, and use negotiation progress to cover military deployments. The problem is that this logic has started to produce side effects.

Politico, a U.S. political news website, cited anonymous officials from the Gulf region saying Trump deliberately exaggerated the progress of talks with Iran; the real aim is to provide himself with an excuse for his earlier “48-hour final deadline.” At the same time, his domestic approval rating has fallen to 36%, his economic approval rating has dropped below 30%, and the pressure ahead of midterm elections is clearly visible. Trump cannot simply stop acting unilaterally without either thoroughly destroying Iran’s nuclear capability or reaching any substantive agreement, and he also cannot keep draining domestic finances with an endlessly prolonged Middle East attrition war. What he truly needs is a “managed exit” somewhere in between: freeze Iran’s nuclear program through negotiations, package it as a “historic victory” to present at home, while keeping military pressure, ensuring he doesn’t lose initiative in the negotiations.

The 15-point plan disclosed by the media—including demands that Iran dismantle uranium-enrichment facilities, transfer highly enriched uranium, cut off support to all proxy armed groups in the region, and guarantee the Strait of Hormuz will remain permanently open—has such a high price that it looks more like “surrender” conditions imposed on Iran. But the existence of this plan itself already has independent political value: it proves to domestic hardliners that Trump has not softened; it assures the market that there may be a cooling of the situation; and it reassures regional allies that Washington still controls the agenda. Whether the plan can be implemented is one thing—it has already fulfilled part of its mission simply by being placed on the table.

How to “trade”?

Statistics show that since the U.S.-Iran conflict broke out, the number of deaths inside Iran has exceeded 3,000. Multiple senior military commanders have been targeted and eliminated, nuclear facilities such as Natanz have been damaged, and oil exports have been severely disrupted. These losses, layered on top of an economic base already heavily battered by long-term sanctions, should not be underestimated.

But severe losses and being prepared to compromise are two completely different judgments. Iran’s actual response reveals its true intentions: Foreign Minister Aragchi made dense rounds of calls with officials from Russia, Turkey, Oman, Pakistan, Egypt, and others to build a diplomatic buffer network. A spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry confirmed that it has “received the U.S.’s request for negotiations through the mediators,” while also warning of “serious consequences for aggression against critical infrastructure.” Meanwhile, Iran appointed hardline veteran Zolqadr of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to replace Larijani, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike last week. By taking charge of the country’s top national security council, the move signals Iran’s intent to stabilize its military system by choosing a hardliner—and also conveys “the will to keep fighting.”

First, Iran’s series of coordinated actions signals acceptance of the plan and keeps communication channels open, but it makes no substantive commitments. At the same time, it maintains a hardline posture in the public sphere, laying groundwork domestically for any concessions it might later have to make.

Late on March 26, Iran formally responded via intermediaries to the U.S.’s proposed 15-point ceasefire plan. But this response is not softening or compromise; it is a counteractive answer. Iran says that first, the other side’s acts of aggression and terrorism must be stopped; second, objective conditions must be created to ensure the war will not be repeated; third, there must be clear commitments and implementation regarding compensation for the losses Iran incurred in the war; and fourth, it must also push all resistance organizations across all fronts and in the region that have participated in the fighting to end their actions. In other words, Iran did not respond within the framework the U.S. set—“nuclear issue—opening the shipping lanes—shrinking the proxy network.” Instead, it tried to shift the negotiating focus back to “responsibility for ceasefire—security guarantees—postwar reparations—simultaneous cooling across the region.”

What the 15-point plan touches is the foundation of the legitimacy of the Iranian regime. Giving up uranium-enrichment rights is tantamount to declaring the failure of the narrative of 40 years of nuclear sovereignty; cutting off support for Hezbollah and the Houthis is tantamount to undermining the strategic depth that Iran relies on in the Middle East landscape in the post-Saddam era. Iran’s insistence on these two lines is not stubbornness for ideological reasons, but a basic strategic judgment that any sovereign state might make under the same conditions.

But Iran is also clearly aware that for negotiations to achieve substantive progress, these two issues are simply unavoidable. The key is not “whether to talk,” but “to what extent to give up”: whether it means a complete, permanent, and verifiable abandonment, or a phased, technical, and temporarily frozen stance with room to maneuver.

For the United States, a form of phased compromise may be technically acceptable. The Iran nuclear deal during the Obama administration was itself built on the basis of “temporary freeze rather than complete elimination.” Iran retained limited uranium-enrichment capability in exchange for easing sanctions. Trump exited that nuclear deal in 2018, one of the reasons being that he believed the deal’s freeze provisions were not thorough enough and not durable enough. This means that if the current negotiations are to reach any agreement, the constraints on the nuclear issue must—at least in form—exceed those of the 2015 deal; otherwise, Trump cannot explain to his domestic audience why he would accept a framework that had already been abandoned earlier.

Israel has fundamental doubts about any “phased freeze”方案. Its logic is that Iran has never truly given up its nuclear ambitions, and that previous agreements have only been tools to buy time. This judgment is not without basis. Under the 2015 agreement framework, Iran still retained substantial technical capability and infrastructure; once the agreement expires, its ability to bounce back is far greater than before the deal was signed. Therefore, Israel insists that any proposal that does not include complete dismantlement, permanent inspections, and zero enrichment is only “buying time” for Iran’s next nuclear breakthrough. This position determines that Israel will obstruct any U.S.-Iran compromise proposal.

The reality Iran needs to face is that it cannot both lift sanctions and fully retain nuclear capability and the proxy armed network. There is a fundamental trade-off logic between the two—that is the essence of the negotiations. If Iran’s negotiating strategy is merely “accept the plan, drag out time, and wait for internal splits in the other side,” the likely result will not be an agreement, but the next round of larger-scale military strikes. At that point, the negotiating window would reopen under even worse conditions.

Everyone has their own calculations

Israel’s situation in this conflict is rather delicate—its military losses are relatively small and it held tactical advantage for a time, but strategically it faces the risk of being marginalized. If the U.S. and Iran reach an agreement, Israel could very well be placed before a fait accompli.

Prime Minister Netanyahu is well aware of this, and he has dispatched his close associate Ron Dermer specifically to monitor U.S.-Iran negotiating developments. Defense Minister Katz also said at the same time that military operations will continue “at full force.” This sentence is not only directed at Tehran; it is also meant to send a signal to Washington—showing that Israel has the capability and the willingness to keep creating fait accompli within the negotiating window, forcing any soft agreement to lose its meaning before it can be implemented.

Israel is more demanding than the U.S. They do not accept Iran retaining any uranium-enrichment capability; they do not accept that the overseas forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps can be fully preserved; and they do not accept any bilateral framework that bypasses Israel. In other words, Israel can accept only an Iran that has had its strategic threat capabilities completely removed—precisely the kind of self-definition Iran will never accept.

One of the fastest-changing variables in the current situation is the position of the Gulf states. At the beginning of the conflict, Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s public stance was cautious and restrained: both opposed the expansion of the war and tried to place themselves outside the conflict. However, Iran’s large-scale retaliatory strikes against the Gulf states then changed this picture. The UAE is the country most affected by this war; under sustained attacks, it shut down Iran-related institutions in Dubai and warned it may freeze tens of billions of dollars in Iranian assets. Its stance has shifted from the initial calls for restraint to substantive pressure.

The New York Times, citing people familiar with the matter, reported that Mohammed bin Salman, the Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, has been urging Trump to “continue this war” to reshape the regional landscape, but Riyadh denies this. Israeli media reported that the UAE has the strongest desire for the war to keep moving forward. One Gulf official said, “Ending the war while Iran still has tools to strike Gulf countries would be a strategic disaster.”

Iran’s large-scale strikes against the Gulf states have not forced Saudi Arabia and the UAE to pressure the U.S. to stop the fighting; instead, they have accelerated the two countries’ steps toward aligning with the U.S.-Israel camp.

The “one-month ceasefire” proposal, along with the intensive leak of the 15-point plan to end the conflict, in the current stage is essentially a negotiating tool—not a true negotiation outcome.

For the U.S., a ceasefire creates a window where it can showcase “results” domestically and also buys time for subsequent negotiations. For Iran, a ceasefire means breathing room, regrouping, and an opportunity to rebuild international sympathy in diplomatic settings. For Israel, a ceasefire is precisely a threat—it could freeze military pressure before Iran’s nuclear facilities have been thoroughly destroyed, creating a strategic deadlock unfavorable to Israel. There are fundamental differences in interests among the three parties regarding the same ceasefire plan.

The market has a clear-eyed assessment. After the ceasefire news emerged, U.S. Treasuries briefly rose in the late session and oil prices edged down slightly, but Brent crude still closed above $104. Traders did not judge that “the conflict is about to end,” but rather that “the conflict could cool down temporarily.” To some extent, this reflects the true state of the negotiations at present.

The most likely parties to serve as substantive intermediaries between the U.S. and Iran are Oman and Pakistan. Oman played a key role in preliminary contacts related to the Iran nuclear deal around 2013. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Sharif has, this week, proactively stated his willingness to mediate, and Trump has reshared the post. However, intermediaries can only provide channels for information transmission; they cannot bridge the structural gap between the parties’ core demands.

Perhaps this round of talks is not even aimed at achieving permanent peace. It is more like a political mechanism that allows each side to find a temporary balance between exhaustion and unfulfilled ambitions. Trump needs a “victory” he can publicize to stop the bleeding in approval ratings. The Iranian regime needs time to consolidate internally, reconstitute military readiness, and repair damaged facilities. Israel needs to ensure that any agreement does not become a shield for Iran to restore its nuclear program. The Gulf states need to ensure their oil and gas are shipped out as quickly as possible.

With the parties’ demands pulling in opposite directions, even if some ceasefire agreement can be implemented, it may still be a temporary document full of loopholes. Each side will interpret and implement it in its own way, regroup, and prepare for the next round of confrontation.

(The author is Executive Director of the Middle East Research Institute at the Peking University HSBC Business School.)

Author: Zhu Zhaoyi

Editor: Xu Fangqing