Why have over 30 products failed to raise funds? Why are bank wealth management products losing popularity?

Ask AI · How does the “asset shortage” affect the market appeal of wealth management products?

On March 27, a reporter from the International Finance News noticed that multiple banks’ wealth management institutions have recently issued announcements showing that several fixed-income wealth management products did not成立 because they failed to meet the subscription minimum. At the same time, in the existing market, certain sub-classes of wealth management products were also terminated early due to their relatively small outstanding size.

Experts interviewed said that the recent frequent occurrence of failed fundraising for fixed-income wealth management products is, from a domestic perspective, essentially a resonance between the “asset shortage” and the contraction on the liability side. Looking ahead, wealth management companies need to rebuild their product lineups, deepen advisory and investment-consulting scenarios, and embrace global allocation.

At least 31 products have been issued but die off before maturity

iFinD data shows that, as of March 27, at least 31 wealth management products issued this year have not成立 due to failed fundraising. The institutions involved include CCB Wealth (Xinyin Wealth?), Huaxia Wealth, Pudong Bank Wealth, Huihua Wealth, CMB Wealth, BoYin Wealth, Everbright Wealth, Nanhai Rural Commercial Bank, among others.

On March 25, an announcement released by CCB Wealth showed that a “Anying Xiang Fixed Income Steady Yield Closed-end No. 332 Wealth Management Product” did not成立. According to the announcement, the product’s fundraising end date was March 23, 2026. The reason it did not成立 was that “the subscription amount for this product did not reach the minimum size stipulated in the product prospectus (RMB 5 million)”; per the prospectus provisions, it did not成立.

The reporter’s review found that, since the beginning of this year, Huaxia Wealth has already had 14 products “fail.” Only between March 17 and March 25, the company announced in batches that 6 products did not成立. Judging from the product prospectus, all 6 products were closed-end wealth management products, and most were fixed-income products. The reason they did not成立 in each case was that the total fundraising amount failed to reach the issuance minimum stipulated in the prospectus.

Why have fixed-income products from wealth management companies been repeatedly failing to raise funds recently?

In Chen Xingwen’s view, Chief Strategy Officer at Kurozaki Capital, this phenomenon is absolutely not coincidental, but rather the inevitable result of multiple forces interweaving.

“From a domestic perspective, this is essentially a resonance between ‘asset shortage’ and ‘contraction on the liability side.’ On the one hand, in a low-interest-rate environment, yields on high-quality fixed-income assets continue to drift downward. Short-end coupon carry is no longer able to cover channel costs and customer expectations, so the product value-for-money on the margin keeps declining. On the other hand, although a cut in listed deposit rates may theoretically benefit the migration of funds into wealth management, residents’ risk appetite repairs are much slower than the flattening of the asset yield curve. As a result, funds are more inclined to flow into money market funds or long-term deposits for ‘safe-haven’ purposes, leading to ‘cold shoulder’ subscription experiences for short-term bond wealth management products. At the regulatory level, new rules for cash management products and an intensified rating framework force institutions to shrink the impulse to scale up and strictly control maturity mismatches. The short-end product supply itself is already proactively reduced in size; combined with the rigid constraints of subscription thresholds, failing to reach the minimum is effectively an amplified low-frequency industry “clearing” noise.” Chen Xingwen analyzed.

Chen Xingwen added that from an international perspective, the central banks in the US and Europe are in a rate-hiking cycle, and the expansion of money market fund size directly squeezes near-term demand for wealth management products. While China is in a rate-cutting channel, global capital’s willingness to allocate to short-end assets in emerging markets has become more cautious, and cross-border capital fluctuations also indirectly affect the stability of banks’ liabilities. What is even more worth warning about is that the lessons from the “demise” of bank wealth management in the era of negative interest rates in Japan and Europe show that if we cannot build investment and research capabilities that can survive through market cycles, fixed-income products that rely solely on channel advantages will ultimately become casualties of falling rates.

Need to rebuild the product lineup

Puiyi Standard’s monitoring data shows that in February 2026, the whole market issued 2,018 new wealth management products, down 522 quarter-over-quarter. Of these, 397 were open-ended products, with an average performance comparison benchmark of 1.85%; 1,621 were closed-end products, with an average performance comparison benchmark of 2.35%.

In fact, in the existing market as well, multiple wealth management products were terminated early. For example, on March 6 this year, Bank of China Wealth issued an announcement titled “Announcement on the Early Termination of Sub-Classes of Three Wealth Management Products.” It stated that the three sub-classes of the wealth management products had relatively small outstanding sizes, and for the protection of investors’ interests, they were terminated early.

With the issuance of the “Interim Measures for the Regulatory Rating of Wealth Management Companies,” overall requirements for regulatory ratings of wealth management companies have tightened, imposing higher standards on asset allocation and compliant operations. Looking ahead, how can wealth management companies break the deadlock?

Chen Xingwen suggested that first, wealth management institutions need to rebuild their product lineup—shifting resources from homogenized short-end bond “red seas” to “fixed-income plus” multi-asset strategies and retirement target-date products, exchanging duration premium and return from volatility for customer stickiness. Second, they should deeply develop advisory service scenarios. By leveraging digital tools, they can turn cold product sales into warm asset allocation services, evolving wealth management subsidiaries from “product factories” into “solution providers.” Third, they should embrace global allocation: within the regulatory framework, expand offshore bond, REITs, and cross-border derivative capabilities, using the low correlation of international assets to hedge domestic interest-rate risks.

“Right now, this fundraising freeze is precisely an opportunity for the industry to be reborn from within—when the tide goes out, only those institutions that dare to tear up the ‘rigid-guarantee shadow,’ and truly anchor themselves with investment research capabilities and customer experience, will be able to go steady and far in the deep waters of the asset management new regulations. This is not only an iteration of the business model, but also a difficult transformation from ‘scale faith’ to ‘value faith,’ and we are standing right at the gateway to this historical turning point.” Chen Xingwen said in his outlook.

Reporter Li Ruohan

Text Editor Yao Hui