$123 million New Taiwan Dollar money laundering case verdict! Professional money launderer fined 600,000, Chinese accomplice exposed

The New Zealand High Court ordered the seizure of approximately NZD 600,000 in illegal proceeds from Auckland man Musabayoufu Fuati. Fuati, along with Chinese accomplice Daniel Hu, between 2018 and 2020, used 12 money mules to deposit a total of NZD 123 million in black money into 400 bank accounts. The seized assets include interest, a BMW, and real estate, totaling NZD 1.16 million, with 50% going to the government.

The Division of Labor and Business Model of Professional Money Launders

Fuati and Daniel Hu previously operated foreign exchange and remittance businesses, with offices located on Queen St, Auckland. They exploited fake identities and a group of interchangeable “money mules” to inject large sums of illicit cash into the banking system from 2018 to 2020. This operational model is extremely rare in New Zealand money laundering crimes, demonstrating that they have developed laundering into a “professional service.”

It is understood that their division of labor was clear: Hu was responsible for collecting large amounts of cash from clients and arranging transfers to overseas accounts, while Fuati handled “money laundering” to avoid bank suspicion. Police surveillance revealed that Hu often secretly exchanged cash with criminals at parking lots and other locations. This professional division of labor greatly increased operational efficiency, with individual cases involving hundreds of thousands of NZD.

Police investigations showed that during this period, a network of about 12 third-party depositors deposited a total of NZD 123,455,400 in cash into approximately 400 bank accounts. These “money mules” were mostly young or vulnerable individuals, earning NZD 100 to 200 for each successful deposit of NZD 100,000. Clients also paid transaction fees ranging from 10% to 20% for cross-border transfers. The high fees indicate that clients urgently needed money laundering services and were willing to pay high costs to evade regulation.

The Three-Tier Structure of the Professional Money Laundering Network

Receiving Layer (Hu): Receiving large sums of cash secretly from drug dealers and scammers at parking lots and other locations.

Laundering Layer (Fuati): Coordinating 12 money mules to split deposits into 400 bank accounts to evade single-transaction monitoring.

Transfer Layer (Overseas Accounts): Transferring the laundered funds overseas to complete cross-border money laundering.

Technical Details of Structuring Transactions to Evade Bank Monitoring

In March 2023, Fuati admitted to the crime of “structuring transactions” (under anti-money laundering laws) and was sentenced to 2 months and 14 days of home detention; Hu admitted to similar charges and four counts of money laundering, receiving a 9-month home detention. Structuring is a classic money laundering technique that involves splitting large sums of cash into multiple small transactions to evade bank reporting obligations for large transactions.

New Zealand law requires reporting any cash transaction over NZD 10,000 to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). Fuati’s network split large cash sums into deposits of NZD 9,000 to 9,500, dispersing them into 400 different bank accounts, successfully bypassing this regulatory safeguard. The 12 money mules deposited at different times and branches, making it difficult for individual banks to detect abnormal patterns.

The sophistication of this method shows Fuati’s deep understanding of anti-money laundering regulations. He even controlled the deposit frequency of individual accounts to prevent multiple deposits within a short period from triggering internal alarms. However, once police integrated and analyzed cross-bank data, the extensive money laundering network was ultimately exposed. The 400 seemingly independent accounts were actually linked to Fuati and Hu’s remittance business.

From the clients’ perspective, the 10% to 20% service fee is extremely high, but for drug dealers and scammers, it is a necessary cost to evade regulation. Legitimate remittance services typically charge no more than 2%, so this tenfold difference reflects the scarcity and high risk premium of money laundering services. This also explains how Fuati accumulated such a large amount of illegal proceeds within three years.

Reclaimed Assets of NZD 1.16 Million and the 50-50 Distribution Dispute

Fuati and Hu were arrested in 2020. Police subsequently froze multiple assets under the Proceeds of Crime Act, including several properties, luxury vehicles (including a Bentley and BMW), bank deposits of about NZD 140,000, and NZD 64,000 in cash, with total seized assets valued at NZD 1,168,606.77.

Police initially planned a four-week confiscation hearing starting in September 2026, but ultimately reached a settlement approved by Auckland High Court Judge Michele Wilkinson-Smith. According to the agreement: 50% of the seized assets go to the government, and the remaining 50% to Fuati’s partner, Tayier Suliya.

This 50-50 split has sparked controversy. The judge noted that police did not charge Suliya with knowledge or participation in the crimes and presumed the assets involved were “relationship property.” Under New Zealand law, property acquired during marriage or cohabitation is presumed to be jointly owned unless proven that the spouse was aware of the illegal source of funds. Since police could not provide sufficient evidence that Suliya knew, the court could only treat the assets as relationship property.

Meanwhile, police agreed to waive seeking larger profit confiscation orders. The court also stated that after the sale of the properties, police would apply for further confiscation of the proceeds. This phased approach reflects the case’s complexity; property values may fluctuate, so police chose to secure a basic confiscation amount first and pursue additional recovery after sale proceeds.

The case originated from a covert investigation codenamed “Operation Martinez,” one of New Zealand police’s early efforts to target “professional money launderers.” Traditional law enforcement often focused on upstream crimes but overlooked intermediaries providing laundering services. In recent years, authorities have recognized that targeting professional money launderers can simultaneously disrupt multiple crime chains, yielding more effective results.